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Government
and Politics

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ECUADOR

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in the General Survey dated September 1968.*

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
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Government and Politics

A. Introduction (S)

Before the Spanish conquest, the territory roughly corresponding to modern Ecuador was called Quito and was part of the Inca Empire. The first inhabitants were known as the Quitu Indians. Their civilization reached its peak in the 10th century, when they were loosely organized in a large number of small, weak groups. They were then invaded by the Cara Indians, who apparently came from the Caribbean region. The Caras developed the Kingdom of Quito; they were conquered in the late 15th century by the Inca emperor, Huayna Capac, who came from what is now Peru. This occurred, however, only shortly before the fall of the Inca Empire after the arrival of the Spaniards. The Inca civilization did not affect the mass of the Ecuadorean Indians, who remained largely passive under both colonial and subsequent republican rule.

During the colonial period the area was known as the Audiencia of Quito and was for a time subordinate to the Viceroyalty of New Castille, with headquarters in Lima; it was later placed under the Viceroyalty of New Granada, ruled from Bogota. These changes, as well as the generally vague nature of colonial boundaries, established the background for later disputes between Ecuador and its neighbors.

When independence from Spain was assured by the defeat of Spanish forces in the Battle of Pichincha in 1822, the Audiencia of Quito joined with Colombia and Venezuela to form the Republic of Gran Colombia. In 1830 a revolutionary junta meeting in Quito declared the province independent from Gran Colombia; a congress declared the territory a sovereign state under the designation "State of Ecuador."

Since colonial times Ecuador has had a succession of constitutions written to embody the ideas of a particular political figure or group, with powerful

leaders emerging on the scene from time to time to give some direction to the political process. The country's present Constitution is its 18th. An Ecuadorean saying calls independence day—13 May 1830—"the last day of despotism and the first day of the same." In the 142 years since independence, there have been 48 elected Presidents, only a few of whom have completed their terms of office. None of the governmental systems established by the constitutions has laid a solid base for subsequent political processes.

After independence Ecuador established a nominally democratic, constitutional government. In reality, however, power belonged to *caudillos*—political bosses with personal power bases. It was during the 19th century also that the basis was laid for the rivalry between the coast (Costa) and the Andean highlands (Sierra), which continues to hinder the development of a truly national consciousness.

Quito, the capital and oldest city, is in the Sierra, while the largest city, Guayaquil, is in the Costa. Quito, still partially controlled by wealthy landowners, is conservative and religious, whereas Guayaquil, strongly influenced by business and commercial interests, is more progressive. Regionalism has been reinforced by granting both the Costa and the Sierra functional representation in Congress for commerce, industry, and labor and by permitting regional officials some autonomy in minor administrative matters. The government has been able to maintain only tenuous dominion over Ecuador's third geographical area, the sparsely inhabited jungle region called the Oriente.

A key factor in the rise of *caudillos* in Ecuador has been the importance of *personalismo*—the adherence to a leader because of his charisma and demagogic ability. The preeminent example of this phenomenon in the last four decades is the octogenarian Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, who was chosen President five times.

but completed only one of the terms. Although ousters of him raised little popular outcry, he was able to return with undiminished appeal and to be elected primarily on the basis of his oratory. His administrative gifts did not match his charisma, however, and his governments usually became riddled with graft and corruption, although Velasco himself was apparently honest. In addition, his ability to inspire confidence rarely extended to politicians not closely associated with him, and he was unable to take the actions necessary for the well-being of the country. Nevertheless, he has remained, even in exile, the leading political figure since the 1930's (Figure 1).

The present administration, which styles itself the Nationalist Revolutionary Government, is headed by Gen. Guillermo Rodriguez Lara, and came to power in a military coup on 15 February 1972, ousting Velasco. As Commander of the Army, Rodriguez was the natural figure around which the movement for a coup coalesced, but he vacillated for some time before setting the ouster of Velasco in motion. One reason for the coup was the presidential election scheduled for June 1972. Many military leaders as well as the political establishment opposed Assad Bucaram, a populist reformist politician, who was a leading candidate. They would have been willing for President Velasco to extend his term past its constitutional termination in August. Although Velasco had ruled with dictatorial powers since June 1970, he was concerned about faring well in the judgment of history and was determined to comply as much as possible with the Constitution.

An additional factor in the movement against Velasco lay in the desire of younger officers to emulate the reformist government in Peru. They disliked the inefficiency and corruption of the Velasco administration and believed that any other civilian government would be just as bad. Furthermore, the military did not want the state revenues expected from newly developed oilfields in the east to fall into the hands of corrupt civilian politicians.

When the military seized power in February 1972, there was very little popular reaction one way or the other. Even the partisans of Assad Bucaram did not protest the action that prevented their leader from campaigning for the Presidency. Most political parties either supported the government openly or adopted a noncommittal attitude. The sole exception was the extreme left, which, weak and fragmented, lacked power or influence to do more than make critical statements.

After the coup, there was considerable disagreement within the government itself, as well as among

members of the military who did not hold government posts, over the pace at which programs, such as agrarian reform, should be undertaken. Many officers, especially in the navy, favored quick governmental action to right age-old wrongs. The President and many of his advisers appreciated the need for reform but planned to move more slowly; during its first months in office the government had a great deal of trouble with organization. In addition, some officials expected that the new revenues from the oilfields would help solve national problems, and they preferred to wait until this money became available. Some in the military were hesitant to make major changes because of complex attendant problems and the relatively weak and indecisive nature of President Rodriguez, who is easily swayed by different military factions. They remember the experience of the military junta of 1963-66, whose reformism aroused widespread opposition.

As a result of longstanding deficiencies, however, the achievement of basic reforms, as well as the development of a strong democratic tradition, is made very difficult under any form of government. Instead, the prospects for violence, ineffective leadership, economic and social stagnation, and political instability are reinforced by a poorly organized and cumbersome public administration and a low level of civic responsibility. Political factionalism and the irresponsibility of the disgruntled aspirants for political power, moreover, have created an atmosphere in which basic national problems may continue to be ignored.

B. Structure and functioning of the government

1. Constitution (U/OU)

Ecuador, perhaps even more than most other Hispanic-American nations, has been plagued by frequently recurring periods of chaos, when little effective government has existed on the national level. During such times a constitutional convention has usually been called, apparently on the assumption that those who participated in drawing up a constitution would seek to bring about a modicum of functioning government under its provisions. The lack of a workable political consensus among ruling circles, however, is revealed by the use of this device 18 times between 1812 and 1967. Contributing to the frequency of new constitutions has been the general view that the purpose of the constitutional and legal systems is to serve as ideals and to elevate the political



**FIGURE I. Ecuadorean
chief executives since 1956
(U/OU)**

behavior of citizens. The notion that constitutions are immutable statements of principle and procedure is not widely held.

Significantly, however, the frequent rewriting of constitutions has brought about little change of form or even of wording. With the exception of issues relating to the role of the Roman Catholic church, there has been little change in basic political philosophy since the birth of the nation. All 16 constitutions since 1830 have provided for a centralized unitary state under a presidential system with separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In all cases there has been a detailed enumeration of rights similar to the U.S. Bill of Rights. A bicameral legislature, made up of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies has been the rule except for the Constitutions of 1830 and 1945.

Constitutional history, from the 1812 Quito State Charter to the Constitution of 1945, was dominated by one basic issue: the relationship between civil and religious authority. This question has provided the principal basis for the enduring dispute between the Conservative and Liberal factions, which represent primarily the respective interests of the Sierra and the Costa.

This struggle for power intimately affected the interests of only a few families in each of the basic regions, but issues of principle, especially religion, involved a broader segment of the population. Nothing has meant so much to the average highlander as being Catholic, and it was this that was threatened by the Liberal factions with their strength on the coast, where, historically, clerical influence has been minimal.

Except for certain economic issues clearly reflecting divergence of regional interests, the basic positions taken by the two factions have been distinguishable from each other only on the questions of church and state. With the exception of the constitution promulgated by General Flores in 1843 and the liberal document of 1878, the constitutions in force between 1812 and 1884 show the clear imprint of the proclericalism of the Conservatives, who were dominant during most of that period. Conversely, the four Liberal constitutions between 1897 and 1945 place strong emphasis on the separation of church and state.

The 1945 Constitution, drawn up under Liberal Party direction, was rejected by President Velasco after it had been in force for just over a year. This document, like its predecessors, was unrealistic in its general political tone and placed some relatively

severe checks on the executive. Velasco suspended the 1945 Constitution by decree on 30 March 1946, but received no support for a new constitutional assembly from the leftist and Radical Liberal parties. Thus, the subsequent constitution, promulgated on 31 December 1946 and drawn up largely under Conservative Party auspices represented a compromise and a synthesis of the conservative and liberal currents in politics. In practical terms, there is little difference between the 1945 and 1946 Constitutions, although the latter removed some of the restraints placed on the President by the previous charter. The 1946 Constitution reinstituted the bicameral legislature and is considered more realistic in some respects than the 1945 document. For example, there are no guarantees of full employment or pure drinking water offered in the 1946 Constitution.

The 1946 Constitution remained in effect until 1967, when the most recent constitution was drawn up. This charter gave the President less power and leeway than the 1945 Constitution, although it extended his power in appointing regional and local leaders. At the time of his ouster in February 1972, President Velasco was engaged in an effort to have the 1946 Constitution amended and reinstated.

When the armed forces took power in February 1972, the Constitution of 1945 was declared to be in force so long as it did not conflict with the aims of the new government. The question of whether the Constitution is now in effect, however, is a moot point, since all government decisions are passed by decree over the President's signature. Many provisions of the 1945 Constitution are simply ignored.

2. Executive branch (C)

Throughout history the ideal Chief Executive in the popular view in Ecuador has been a strong President who could dominate the Congress and could implement decisions. Nevertheless, total arbitrariness, without regard to public opinion, has never been tolerated. Presidents who declared themselves dictators or attempted to prolong their term in office beyond what had become traditional limits were quickly overthrown or killed.

President Rodríguez, however, often vacillates when forced to make decisions. Thus, in the first few months of the military administration few policies were made swiftly, and the government was left pretty much to run itself. It appears moreover, that the advisory system employed by the President has operated on a hit-or-miss basis, and that there are as yet no formal channels of authority.

In the present government (Figure 2) both executive and legislative powers are wielded by the executive branch. The requirement of the 1945 Constitution for a separate legislative body has been ignored, and no Vice President has been designated. The President is assisted by a Cabinet composed primarily of senior active duty or retired military officers. The ministries of the Cabinet¹ are as follows:

Agriculture and Livestock	National Defense
Education	Natural Resources and Energy
Finance	Public Health
Foreign Affairs	Public Works and Communications
Government and Police	Social Welfare and Labor
Industries, Commerce, and Integration	

When the armed forces first took power, the Council of Government, made up of the commanders of the three services, was formed. This council was given the power to act as a legislative advisory group and to "audit" the acts of the government. Not long after the coup, however, personal and service rivalries began to emerge. The three commanders were replaced, and the membership of the Council of Government was changed to representatives designated by them and formally appointed by the President. In November 1972 the council was dissolved and replaced by the Legislative Commission, which is to develop draft laws and legal reforms as well as to codify existing laws. The commission consists of five lawyers appointed by the President.

Of more importance in articulating and directing government policies is the National Security Council; it was originally set up by the military junta of 1963-66 and has remained a part of the executive branch in some form since. In the present government the council is composed of the President (who serves as chairman), the Cabinet ministers, the three military service commanders, the Chairman of the Economic Planning and Coordination Board, and the President of the Monetary Board. The Chief of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces acts as adviser on national military security matters. A number of working agencies are authorized as part of the National Security Council, including the Directorate General of Intelligence, the Directorate General of National Mobilization, and the Institute of Advanced National Studies.

On paper the functions of the National Security Council are extensive and fundamental. It proposes

¹For a current listing of key government officials, consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.




FIGURE 2. Structure of the government, November 1972 (U/OU)

the overall governmental strategy to achieve national security objectives and assists the President in the formulation of foreign, domestic, military, and economic policies. In practice the functioning and power of the council are vague and seem to be based as much on personalities and military cliques as on formal legal requirements.

The 1945 Constitution gave the legislature wide powers in determining budgetary and fiscal matters. This authority has not been delegated to either the Legislative Commission or to the National Security Council. Instead, the Minister of Finance draws up the budget, which is submitted to the Cabinet and the President for approval. Decrees usually are issued in the name of the President and the Cabinet; sometimes

only the ministers involved sign the decree. The Attorney General, Comptroller General, and Superintendent of Banks and Companies are not included in the Cabinet but hold separate appointments by the President.

The executive branch also includes many quasi-autonomous agencies concerned with social and economic operations on national, provincial, and lower levels. In the past, however, these agencies have not been responsive to control by the Cabinet or the legislature and have been the pawns of interest groups. President Velasco reduced their number from more than 1,000 in 1970 to 700; an announced goal of the military government is to reduce their number further and place the remainder under the supervision of the ministries.

Two independent advisory agencies exercise an important influence on the economy. The Economic Planning and Coordination Board, appointed by the President, advises the President on trade and financial policy and submits to him programs for improvement in agriculture, fishing, manufacturing, transportation, communications, and public administration. Because the military leaders know relatively little about economic policy, this board is likely to have a fairly free hand in developing its own role. The Monetary Board, composed of several Cabinet ministers and civilian advisers appointed by the President, is semiautonomous in matters of monetary policy.

No stable civil service has yet developed. It has long been customary for a new President to reward his most important supporters with government posts of some responsibility or power. The patronage system encompasses all positions of authority within the executive branch and extends downward, even to positions on the local level that command no salary but, because of graft and other perquisites, can be profitable. Most government employees have little or no training in public administration. Lack of skills and fear of losing their jobs cause many to confine themselves to routine tasks and to avoid responsibilities. Because salaries are low, many civil servants seek supplemental employment and spend little time on their government jobs; others accept bribes. A number of attempts have been made to create a nonpolitical civil service through competitive examinations, but in the past these efforts have not been successful.

The military government is attempting to reduce the corruption that has plagued virtually all Ecuadorean Governments. One decree requires civilians to serve for 2 years in any appointed government post. Penalties for noncompliance are

severe. Presumably, this requirement discourages civilians from entering the government to make a quick killing and forces them to be more responsible civil servants. In addition, all officials of the administration are required to submit a financial statement upon assuming office, and an audit is to be conducted when they leave. The military government also hopes to deter further corruption by publicly bringing charges against former government officials accused of improper conduct. This procedure may embarrass the government if the charges do not hold up in the courts, however.

3. Judicial branch (U/OU)

The judicial system has traditionally been highly centralized, with local courts subordinated to provincial courts or Superior Courts. Since 1972, military, customs, and other specialized courts, with special appeal channels, have handled special categories of cases. Judicial proceedings tend to be very lengthy; individual cases have remained in process for several years. There is much emphasis on reducing every aspect of a case to written records and on giving lengthy explanations of the rationale behind each decision. Bribery is routine at lower levels, and political influence is keenly felt at higher levels. Few, if any, safeguards function against the abuse of the system at any level, and this is a special problem in places distant from the capital. The judges are generally regarded as well versed in law. Criticism of the courts usually centers on administrative procedures and delay in handling cases.

With the exception of the introduction of fixed terms of office with the Constitution of 1845, there was little change in the judicial system between 1830 and 1972, when the new government began a reorganization. A decree issued in March 1972 revised the Supreme Court and gave it the responsibility for revising the lower court system. The decree specifically forbade nepotism and recommended free legal services for lower income groups, at least for some categories of cases. Subsequent government activity may lead to further centralization of the judicial system and may strengthen the hand of the executive in appointing justices to the higher courts.

The Supreme Court is headed by a president and consists of five chambers of three justices each and a minister attorney general. The president is appointed from among the justices. Supreme Court members are appointed by the President of Ecuador for a 6-year term, renewable indefinitely. They must be Ecuadorean born, at least 30 years of age, and have at least 10 years of legal experience. The Supreme Court

exercises a supervisory role over the entire judicial system. It has the power to suspend laws and decrees deemed by it to be unconstitutional as well as to prepare drafts of new laws and decrees. There is no specialization among the chambers; criminal and civil cases are apportioned on the basis of chance and workload. For treason and other serious offenses, such as malfeasance in high office, the court sits as a whole.

There are 15 Superior Courts with original jurisdiction in criminal cases involving provincial governors, mayors, members of electoral tribunals, customs officials, provincial judges, and police officials. According to the reorganization decree, the Supreme Court makes appointments to the Superior Courts, and the latter are to reorganize the lower courts. Judges of the provincial and cantonal courts are appointed by the appropriate Superior Courts. The Superior Courts have appellate jurisdiction in all other criminal and civil cases. Each Superior Court, in addition to its judicial duties, is responsible for the inspection of the penal system within its district.

Except in the Oriente, each province has at least one criminal court, which sits in the capital, and as many other criminal courts as distances and population distribution require. Cases originating in the Oriente are heard in the nearest criminal court in the Sierra. The provincial criminal courts are the courts of first instance in most criminal cases and do not hear cases involving government officials. They function independently from the provincial civil court system. For the more serious criminal cases in each locality where a provincial court sits, there is a special five-member tribunal called the *tribunal del crimen*, presided over by the judge of the provincial criminal court.

The cantonal courts are the lowest courts of record in the judicial hierarchy. They deal exclusively with original cases. The political lieutenants, though not officials of the judicial system, perform a number of judicial duties at the parish level. They generally have no judicial training and are essentially representatives of the executive. They handle minor cases, including many misdemeanors, and they function in the parishes as both judge and prosecutor. The local police officer also serves as judge in trying some minor offenses.

In July 1972 the military government established six special military courts, three each in Quito and Guayaquil, to try persons accused of misusing public funds, abuse of office, terrorism, sabotage, and subversion. These special tribunals consist of two senior military judges and one civilian judge. The creation of these tribunals has caused considerable controversy, especially among legal, political, and

public media groups. The tribunals have made a slow start, but the government has announced that they will help end "legal decadence," "moralize" the country, and expedite an admittedly slow system of justice.

After arrest by the police, a suspect must be turned over to a competent judge, usually of the local cantonal court, who conducts an investigation to determine whether there are sufficient grounds for trial. According to law, this investigator must forward in writing his findings to the judge of the provincial court within 15 days.

If the recommendation is for trial, power over the accused passes to the judge of the provincial criminal court. The accused is entitled to legal counsel, either selected and paid by him or furnished from a panel of lawyers formed annually to serve as public defenders. Usually the proceedings are based on transcriptions of statements made by each side through the defender or the prosecutor rather than on oral testimony in the courtroom. Although under certain circumstances the accused can be authorized to confront witnesses, this is seldom done.

The prison system consists of a central penitentiary in Quito, local jails, and a penal colony on the Galapagos Islands. The system lacks the facilities to play a constructive role in the rehabilitation of convicts. Prisons and jails are extremely overcrowded and exercise little more than a custodial function. Conditions make it impossible to segregate young first offenders from hardened criminals.

4. Provincial and local government (U/OU)

Ecuador is a unitary state, and the central government has granted only limited powers to its subordinate jurisdictions: 19 provinces; the Galapagos Islands, a territory; 103 cantons and 852 parishes. In March 1972 military officers were appointed governors of all the provinces theoretically under the Minister of Government and Police. In practice they usually operate under the Minister of National Defense. It is not yet clear whether these governors in turn have the right to appoint political chiefs of the cantons and political lieutenants of each parish, as was the case with their civilian predecessors.

The military administration has given the governors the right to supervise and control the provincial governments as well as other public and private legal enterprises "having a social or public function and financed by appropriated funds, taxes, or government subsidies." In addition, the governors may issue orders with the force of law when a state of siege or a security zone is decreed within their jurisdictions.

The municipal government in urban areas has been a relatively strong institution. The popularly elected municipal council has been fairly free to handle all purely local matters without outside interference. In fact, a major factor making for continuity and orderly government throughout the turbulent constitutional history has been the semiautonomous status of the municipalities, which have continued to function with varying degrees of effectiveness, whether or not viable government on a national or provincial level existed.

C. Political dynamics

The various Ecuadorean constitutions have stipulated a system of representative democracy, but political reality has prevented such a structure from developing. Although the size of the electorate has grown, political activity has remained the preserve of a white, elite oligarchy—about 10% of the population—with well over half of the population still disenfranchised by such restrictions as permitting only the literate to vote. (U/OU)

Within this political arena, the most important single factor has been the cult of personalities rather than the appeal of political programs. Most parties were originally formed for the express purpose of furthering the political ambitions of a particular leader. This has led to a multiplicity of parties but a scarcity of fundamental programs for furthering popular aspirations. Regional rivalry between the coastal and highland areas continues to restrain the development of nationally organized parties. Each section can command its mass of semiliterate street agitators to threaten violence and challenge the authority of the government. (U/OU)

The role of political parties has been further weakened under the current military government. Virtually no political activity is evident, and the government has made it clear that no serious political activity, much less opposition, will be tolerated. The principal political problem remains the lack of a broad electorate with enough sophistication to demand and support national political leaders dedicated to improving the general material well-being. Although the military took over in February 1972 with announced reformist intentions, the new leadership has not enunciated a clear program that would lead to basic changes in the political system. (U/OU)

1. Political forces

a. Military (C)

For almost a century and a half the military has frequently been drawn into Ecuadorean politics. Even

when the President himself has been a civilian, his tenure has rested ultimately on the acquiescence of the armed forces. A classic example of the role played by the military occurred during the events leading up to the coup on 15 February 1972. Disenchantment with civilian politicians was a major factor in the military's desire to prevent populist politician Assad Bucaram from entering the race for the presidential election scheduled for June 1972. Military leaders were willing to have President Velasco remain in power, even beyond the scheduled expiration date of his term. They were unwilling, however, to risk Bucaram's election and then be forced to oust the legitimate popular choice.

Once the military leaders leaned toward action, other considerations came into play. One was disgust at the rampant corruption in the Velasco administration. Although many military officers are themselves involved in graft, the armed forces as a whole see themselves as the protector of the people and the guardian of national morality. President Velasco's inability to control the graft of his subordinates was for military leaders a violation of the trust placed in him. This sentiment was also a factor in the overthrow in 1963 of President Carlos Julio Arosemena, although more important causes for the military coup were his toleration of developing security threats and his drunken debauchery, which had become a public scandal.

As a corollary to the belief that the armed forces have a responsibility for the public welfare, the two most recent military governments (1963-65 and since 1972) have undertaken programs of social and economic reform aimed at improving the life of the "average" Ecuadorean.

A split, however, between the traditional and the more reformist military officers is indicative of a growing heterogeneity within the armed forces. Interservice rivalry has long been serious, and in many respects constitutes the most severe problem facing the Rodriguez government. The President is an army brigadier general, and the majority of the military Cabinet members are from the army. The navy and air force resent what they consider disproportionate army representation in the government. Membership in a particular military group or loyalty to a specific officer is often the most important determinant of how high an officer will rise in the military hierarchy or, in this case, in the government. The overwhelming majority of the combined officer corps is from the Sierra, and the armed forces are consequently less popular along the coast. President Rodriguez has made an effort to expand contacts between the military and the different parts of the country, especially the coastal

area. Visits to provincial capitals by government officials, including the President, are frequent.

The Ecuadorian Navy, unlike navies of most other Latin American countries, is the most progressive of the three services. This can be traced partly to the fact that the navy's traditional center of power has been the coastal provinces, historically the most liberal area of the country. The navy has resisted attempts by the army to undercut its influence there.

Ultrationalism among naval officers, including several present and former Cabinet ministers, has brought them in conflict with the President and other military leaders who seem to favor a more moderate course. The navy has consistently adopted a hard line on most foreign policy issues, including enforcement of Ecuador's claim to a 200-mile territorial sea and the question of control over natural resources. In the present government, this attitude has at times conflicted with the more moderate sentiments of President Rodriguez and several ministers.

Many younger officers in all three services favor more radical government policies, such as those followed by the revolutionary regime in Peru. Thus far, Rodriguez has steered a moderate course and has avoided firm commitment to either the left or the right. Although the military government characterizes itself as revolutionary, it has failed to enunciate a clearly reformist strategy. There are elements of conservatism and liberalism within the armed forces, and the President has had a difficult time keeping them in balance. Several reform measures are under consideration, including an agrarian program and a new higher education law, but they have not yet gone beyond the planning stage.

b. Political parties (S)

Under the present government, parties as such play no role in the political process. None openly opposed the coup; even the party of Assad Bucaram, the leading challenger, did not engage in counter-demonstrations. The parties took a similarly passive course when President Velasco assumed dictatorial powers in June 1970, in the face of severe student, labor, and economic disruption. Political parties have shown a remarkable ability to survive, however, and they are beginning to criticize the military government more openly.

The government has shown more interest in maintaining good relations with the Communist Party of Ecuador than with the democratically oriented parties and personalistic leaders. The party leadership, in return, has stated its support of several policies of the government and has sought to avoid a

confrontation with it. This flirtation with the party is probably less an indication of the direction in which the government is moving than a realization that Communist support may be more useful in giving credibility to the regime's self-professed revolutionary credentials. The government may also hope to use Communist support to counterbalance any opposition that may arise from non-Communist parties.

(1) Personalist parties

(a) NATIONAL VELASQUISTA FEDERATION—Used by Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra as an electoral vehicle, the National Velasquista Federation (FNV) was the winning party in the presidential election of 1968. Based only on the personality of Velasco, who is in exile, the party may have difficulty holding together as a viable force.

The FNV is an improvised organization of provincial notables, loyal velasquistas, and ambitious opportunists. It obtained legal recognition as a party in April 1968. Small provincial velasquista movements are loosely associated with the FNV and are dedicated to promoting Velasco.

(b) CONCENTRATION OF POPULAR FORCES—Established in 1949 as the organizational vehicle for the personal ambitions of Carlos Guevara Moreno, the Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP) probably would have played an important role in the 1972 elections. Since 1960 Assad Bucaram (Figure 3) has risen to be the party leader, and he was the foremost candidate in the 1972 presidential electoral campaign. The strength of the CFP is centered in Guayaquil, and its formidable organization there was enhanced by the patronage that Bucaram controlled as mayor of the city. The CFP also had developed some strength in a number of other coastal provinces and as the elections approached expanded its following in a few cities in the Sierra, such as Quito, Riobamba, Ibarra, and Ambato.

The CFP has no fixed ideology other than promoting better living for the poor, but Bucaram appeals to the have-nots and articulates their aspirations. Through his vigorous policy of honest municipal administration, tax and other reforms, and housing and other development projects, Bucaram captured the loyalty of municipal employees, office workers, and a large bloc of employed and unemployed workers in Guayaquil and other coastal areas. Although Bucaram has opposed organized communism, his politics caused him to be disliked by the oligarchy and by some members of the military. The established businessmen feared that he would undertake a policy of indiscriminate nationalization,

FIGURE 3. Assad Bucarain, leader of the Concentration of Popular Forces (U/OU)



and his treatment of some foreign-owned businesses during his tenure as mayor of Guayaquil made foreign investors uneasy. He subsequently became prefect of Guayas Province but was ousted by Velasco for alleged subversive activities in September 1970 and sent to exile in Panama. He was allowed to return in May 1971 but was again exiled in June; he was permitted to return in January 1972. Although he professed to believe that the worst democracy was better than the best dictatorship, many observers saw authoritarian tendencies in him and were loath to give him an opportunity to exercise them on a national level. Since the coup, Bucarain has undertaken no political activity. He reportedly will work as a traveling textile salesman, an occupation that provides an opportunity to maintain political contacts throughout the country.

(c) SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY—Organized in 1951, the Social Christian Party (PSC) is the personal vehicle of Camilo Ponce Enríquez. Although the party does not have a strong structure, Ponce is an astute politician and has been able to attract support from other political organizations; there are a number of cooperating but independent ponceista organizations in various provinces.

The PSC appeals primarily to the upper class, well-to-do citizens, and other conservatives who are attracted by the strong character and administrative skills of Ponce, who was President of Ecuador from 1956 to 1960, as well as by the party's independence from the Roman Catholic Church in comparison with the Conservative Party. Ponce also has support among some landowners and middle class professionals and among upper class women. Because the PSC has a weak and spotty national organization, however, it has depended on Ponce's personal prestige and wealth and the support of prominent men in various provinces.

(2) Traditional parties

(a) CONSERVATIVE PARTY—Founded in 1863, the Conservative Party (PC) is the oldest and best organized party in Ecuador. It has administrative units, at least theoretically, in all provinces and most cantons and parishes. Although it has some following in the Costa, its basic strength is in the Sierra, where it appeals to landowners, middle class professionals, and Roman Catholic intellectuals and priests. The party has maintained close connections with the powerful and basically conservative Roman Catholic Church. Its programs usually have reflected the views and interests of landowners and other conservative elements. Since the mid-1960's, however, it has professed to support more progressive social and economic ideas that appeal to a broader electorate. From 1956 to 1960 and since 1966 the PC has cooperated more or less consistently with the PSC, although this alliance did not meet with the approval of all members of the party. Of the two main factions, one is led by Carlos Arizaga Vega, whose followers are mostly the traditional elite, and the other by Galo Pico Mantilla, whose supporters are generally from the middle and upper middle class and include many professionals.

(b) RADICAL LIBERAL PARTY OF ECUADOR—Although its principal strength is in the coastal provinces, the Radical Liberal Party of Ecuador (PLRE) is theoretically organized in all provinces and most cantons and parishes. Its leadership has been weakened by divisive personal rivalries. Usually called the Liberal Party, its political philosophy was shaped by Eloy Alfaro, who led the revolt that brought the party to power in 1895. He established one of the most advanced democratic constitutions in the country's history, and he worked toward the separation of church and state, universal suffrage, free secular education, and the first labor codes. In addition, the party espouses such programs as agrarian, tax, and

budgetary reforms to promote greater social justice. Liberal support comes from businessmen, middle class professionals, and anticlerical intellectuals. Many government employees and some schoolteachers are sympathizers or members. The party had agreed to support Assad Bucaram in the 1972 presidential election, but this decision was not popular throughout the party, and it faced internal dissension at the time of the military coup. Among the more important leaders are Francisco Huerta Montalvo and Abdon Calderon Munoz. Huerta was a strong proponent of the PLRE alliance with the CFP. Calderon opposed the military junta that took power in 1963, but he has made no statement about the present government.

(c) ECUADOREAN SOCIALIST PARTY—Founded in 1926, the Ecuadorean Socialist Party (PSE) is the third oldest party, but it has never attained great size or importance because of internal personal and ideological conflicts. Several years ago the party split into two separate movements: the PSE, led by Gonzalo Oleas and recognized by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), which has several well-known leaders, such as Fabian Jaramillo and Carlos Cueva Tamariz. In recent years members of both groups have made overtures toward reunification but without success. Despite the desire behind the moves, unification will be difficult to achieve.

Neither Socialist faction has anything approaching a viable national organization, and neither has significant electoral strength. The PSE has some support in Guayas and Pichincha Provinces, and the PSU has some following in most of the other provinces. Both have latent strength in labor, but they appeal mainly to intellectuals and teachers in the public school system. Although many Socialist leaders continue to profess their adherence to Marxism, most preach an attenuated form of socialism. In fact, the PSU at its 1966 congress changed its declaration of principles by omitting any mention of faith in Marxism. Few Socialists have ever seriously attempted to implement radical programs while serving in government positions.

(3) Marxist parties

(a) COMMUNIST PARTY OF ECUADOR—Headed by Secretary General Pedro Saad (Figure 4), the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) is legal and had planned to participate to some extent in the 1972 elections. The PCE has about 500 members, with some 2,500 sympathizers. It issues a biweekly newspaper *El Pueblo*, as well as sporadic special publications.



FIGURE 4. Pedro Saad, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Ecuador (U/OU)

The PCE has been plagued by splits, the most serious of which occurred in 1962, when a group of hardline members deserted and formed a splinter group known as the Communist Party of Ecuador/Marxist-Leninist (PCE/ML). Its members were militant Communists who favored violent revolution rather than the pro-Moscow line, which the PCE hierarchy advocated. Both parties claim to be the official Communist Party of Ecuador, but only the PCE is recognized by Communists who accept Moscow's leadership. Regional rivalries within Ecuador further divide the PCE, which has its headquarters and most of its strength in Guayaquil.

The PCE is theoretically organized along the same lines as most other Communist parties. Its vicissitudes, however, have prevented it from operating in a fully organized manner for some years. Each regional group is headed by a separate secretary general, who is its chief spokesman and serves as chairman of its executive committee, which normally includes various functional secretariats for youth, Indian, and labor affairs. The central committee is the policymaking body elected by and theoretically responsible to a national congress, the highest official organ. Each regional group operates on the principle of democratic centralism, although in theory the lower echelons have an important voice in determining party policies. Congresses are attended by representatives of regional, provincial, zonal, and local committees and by some

of the more important members of certain cells. Delegates to the congress discuss party problems and vote on proposals already cleared by the central committee. The various party committees are all charged with carrying out the resolutions passed by the congresses and overseeing the work of subordinate units. The central committee also determines disciplinary measures. The role of the cell, considered the most fundamental party unit, theoretically is to lead the public toward a realization of party objectives through the study of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the discussion of party activities. Membership in the regional and zonal committees varies throughout the country, but statutes require that cells have at least three members. Both factions of the party claim to be the legal heirs of the congress held in Guayaquil in March 1962, during which the split developed between the extremists and the pro-Moscow faction.

The PCE continues to be dependent on the Soviet Union for financial aid. Other kinds of aid extended by the Soviets include payment of passage for PCE leaders attending meetings in the East European Communist countries and scholarships for students to study in the Soviet Union. The governments of Cuba, China, and other Communist countries have periodically been in contact with the PCE and have provided funds for certain Communist activities. Aside from the known Soviet financial support, there is very little indication that any foreign country has provided either the PCE or the PCE/ML with significant assistance in the past several years, although the PCE/ML does receive some financial aid from Communist China.

The PCE's youth organization, the Communist Youth of Ecuador (JCE), has a membership of about 300, with about 400 sympathizers. The JCE is the largest and most viable Communist youth group in Ecuador. Its secretary general, Solon Guerrero Metz, is a member of the PCE and has undertaken various jobs for the party.

The PCE has never attempted guerrilla warfare or terrorism as a means to overthrow the government; it has publicly denounced such tactics and indicated its support for the *via pacifica* or nonviolent approach to revolution. Realizing that armed conflict may be necessary at some stage in the revolution, however, the PCE has sent trainees to a guerrilla warfare training school in Moscow.

(b) **FAR LEFTIST PARTIES**—The extreme left in Ecuador is small and characterized by a multiplicity of contending movements, the most important of which are the PCE/ML, the Revolutionary Socialist

Party of Ecuador (PSRE), the Revolutionary Communism of Ecuador (CRE), and the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR).

The PCE/ML was organized in 1962 by pro-Chinese-line dissident members of the PCE led by Rafael Echeverria Flores. It has 60 to 80 active members and some 500 sympathizers. It is relatively ineffective; its main strength has been in the universities. The PCE/ML receives some financial aid from Communist China. It attempted to initiate guerrilla warfare several times in the early 1960's, but its efforts proved abortive.

The PSRE, a hard-line offshoot of the old Ecuadorean Socialist Party, lost much of its strength after the universities were closed in 1970. It has about 350 members and some 100 youth members. Its leader, Jose Telmo Hidalgo Diaz, reportedly has ties to Cuba, and the PSRE may receive some financial aid and training from Cuba.

The CRE is a small, ineffective splinter group that broke from the PCE/ML in 1967. It has about 20 active members and 100 sympathizers. Although it has loose ties to Communist China, its attempts to organize peasants have been feeble, and it has virtually no influence among students or labor.

The only group that could be considered a "revolutionary vanguard" in the Castroite sense is the MIR, which reached its peak of activity during the mid-1960's but has since declined. It may have as many as 10 members.

Although Communist elements have never been an important force in political life, they have at times achieved influence far out of proportion to their size through adept use of popular front tactics and superior organization and drive. The bulk of the Communist membership is in Guayas, Manabi, and Pichincha Provinces.

2. Pressure groups

a. *Oligarchic interest groups (U/OU)*

Members of the wealthiest families seldom participate personally in politics, aside from an occasional selection for diplomatic posts in Europe or the United States or as foreign minister. Their control over the political process is nonetheless real. The oligarchy includes the Quito upper class—with colonial aristocratic antecedents and fortunes originally amassed through ownership of land—and the newer oligarchy on the coast, which generally lacks the aristocratic lineage but is wealthier. Over the years the oligarchy has enjoyed a privileged status, regardless of the particular political faction in office at

the moment. This status, however, has come to be endangered, most recently by the presidential candidacy of Assad Bucaram in early 1972 before the coup. The Roman Catholic Church, the armed forces, and nearly all political parties are on record as favoring basic structural reforms, especially in land tenure and taxation. Many individuals who enjoy wealth and high social status accept in principle the need for such changes without being willing to implement measures that would affect their own fortunes adversely.

Members of Guayaquil's commercial and financial elite may espouse such liberal principles as the expansion of popular participation in government, but they generally seem less disposed toward social and economic reforms. The Costa elite participates in the political process by financing the campaigns of various parties and factions. It is also well organized, principally through the Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce, and capable of raising the banner of regional autonomy whenever its interests are threatened by the national government.

The provincial landowners form the most conservative of all significant political groups. Their strength is much greater in the Sierra than in the Costa, and they are especially powerful in provincial and municipal affairs in the south. Until its dissolution in 1970, landowner associations were strongly represented in Congress, both through the regional senators and deputies representing the southern highland provinces and through the functional senators elected by the associations themselves. Because there are few prominent persons in the Sierra whose origin is not from among the major landholding families, there are broad sympathy and support for the landowner viewpoint among those who monopolize most instruments of power.

Because small individual contributions to political parties are rare, and because each party has limited following, parties have to depend to a considerable extent on the largesse of wealthy individuals or economic interest groups. It is customary for most donors to expect large returns on their investment, and most of them assume a patronal role toward the dependent party leaders, who are expected to assume a properly subservient attitude. Corruption is widely assumed to be an institutionalized attribute of partisan activities, and party platforms have little credibility. Consequently, many politicians claim to be members of no political party.

Although exertion of influence by the upper class continues to be largely informal and to proceed through the traditional channels of colleague

relationships and familial ties, there has been a proliferation since the mid-20th century of associational interest groups bringing collective pressures to bear. Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture have become increasingly important, even in provincial capitals, where informal connections were previously considered sufficient.

b. Students (S)

Despite the relatively small following enjoyed by the various Communist factions among the population as a whole, these factional parties influence a large number of youth and students not formally identified with them and their organizations. Many students in Ecuadorean universities are receptive to radical—often revolutionary—ideas. Although this trait is common to many students in Latin America, frustrations arising from the rigid social structure in Ecuador, lack of any effective political mechanisms, and dismal economic development have facilitated efforts by organized leftist groups to exploit the students.

Two student groups in the past have exerted significant pressure from time to time. The major student group is the Federation of Ecuadorean University Students (FEUE), which was founded in 1945. It claims to represent some 40,000 students at five public and two Catholic universities, one non-Catholic private university, and the polytechnical schools. Although FEUE is dominated by a small number of highly influential political activists, who generally follow a radical leftist line and are committed to the overthrow of the government, this leadership has generally avoided applying the more extreme Communist tactics to reach its goals. Instead, it has chosen to focus on selected issues, such as the hated Rio Protocol and university and other educational problems, as the means of arousing students and retaining its control of the federation.

Public secondary school students are not as politically influential as university students, but they are a strong social force in Ecuador. Their attitudes, though often poorly defined, generally correspond to those of the university students. Secondary students have played an active role in demonstrations, particularly in Guayaquil and Quito, some of which have had political objectives. Young and easily aroused, they are more prone than university students to take to the streets in support of ill-defined causes. University students have been known to encourage their younger colleagues to join them in street demonstrations but then fade away when the police

arrive, leaving the secondary students to bear the brunt of the ensuing clash.

The only officially recognized national organization representing secondary students is the Ecuadorean Federation of Secondary Students (FESE). Although its stated purpose is to avoid political involvement and work for better education and national development, it is, in fact, controlled by leftists, and its president is a leader of the MIR. FESE, although strong in certain schools, especially in the Costa, has not been able to influence the formation of national policies. Private schools are not organized politically and have no influence on the national scene.

Student agitation has played an important role in Ecuadorean politics. Although minor parochial issues are often the immediate causes of student unrest, unyielding government reaction and efforts by leftists to exploit the situation have often caused minor incidents to escalate into major confrontations with the authorities. It is unusual for a month to pass without at least a few secondary schools and universities either being struck or closed by the government.

Student discontent during the most recent Velasco administration was particularly severe. In 1969, for example, students joined a strike by the National Educators' Union to obtain back pay and the removal of the Minister of Education. The students also demanded that university entrance exams be abolished and that vocational training be expanded. This strike virtually paralyzed education for several weeks at the primary and secondary school levels, and rioting broke out a number of times at universities. The government was able to restore order only by acceding to most student demands and putting into effect firm security measures.

Student agitation played an important part in President Velasco's decision to assume dictatorial powers in June 1970. At that time the universities were closed and the student groups outlawed. The Universities of Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca, and Loja remained closed until January 1971. They reopened under a law that barred all former rectors, vice rectors, and deans from resuming their positions and placed some restraints on their autonomy.

There have been scattered incidents of violent student agitation since the military took power in February 1972, but none of major proportions. The government has spoken out firmly against violence by students.

c. The Roman Catholic Church (U/OU)

Throughout most of Ecuador's history the Roman Catholic Church has been a conservative influence in politics, and few Ecuadorean clerics have shared the more progressive outlook of some European ecclesiastical authorities. In the last few years, however, the Catholic hierarchy, under pressure from below, has demonstrated a more liberal trend. For example, the church has begun implementing an agrarian reform program which includes distributing some of its own land to the peasants.

Many within the Ecuadorean church agree that it should help foster social change. The church can be described as groping for a positive role in a complex political environment, but it is handicapped in its search by lack of social expertise. Younger, socially aware priests seem ready to act for the sake of action, but they suffer from the same lack of guidelines that afflicts the church as a whole. Certainly, there is little guarantee that the programs would be constructive or could be integrated into a coherent policy which the church could endorse.

Cardinal Munoz Vega, head of the Catholic Church in Ecuador, is progressive, but feels that the church may not be capable of instituting the rapid changes required in society. Despite his seeming receptivity to reform and change, Munoz chose as auxiliary bishops for Quito and as Archbishop of Guayaquil prelates who were highly regarded by the conservative Papal Nuncio. Munoz also issued a pastoral letter in April 1969 criticizing clerical and lay dissidence in the church.

Pressure from the younger, more liberal elements appears to be exerted primarily on the church hierarchy rather than directly on the government. For example, in April 1971 about 100 priests, including Bishop Leonidas Proano of Riobamba, held a conference at which both the secular and ecclesiastical establishments were criticized. Bishop Proano, one of the most outspoken advocates of social reform, accused the church of accepting placidly its position as a beneficiary of the established order. He said that priests should work for social change but should remain apart from partisan politics.

d. Labor unions (U/OU)

Labor unions occasionally have participated in important political events, such as the ouster of President Velasco in November 1961 and the military junta in 1966, although they were not involved in the 1972 coup. They have not, however, been a consistent pressure group in national politics. Only about 12% of

the labor force is organized, and this portion is mainly in urban areas. Agricultural workers, who make up the bulk of the labor force, are for the most part unorganized, except for some workers in the large coastal plantations.

Ineffective leadership and divergent goals have precluded the formation of a united labor front to oppose or support a particular government. The largest national trade union confederation is the Ecuadorean Confederation of Free Labor Organizations (CEOSL). Formed in 1962 as a democratically oriented trade union organization, CEOSL has consistently opposed the present military regime. With a membership of approximately 40,000, CEOSL recently surpassed the Communist-controlled Confederation of Ecuadorean Workers (CTE) in size.

Following the lead of the Ecuadorean Communist Party, the CTE has tried to establish a close relationship with the new military rulers. The organization has openly applauded many governmental policies, but its influence on policy has been limited because of dissension within the organization and the government's less than full endorsement of the CTE approaches. In general these disputes have occurred when the leaders and militant factions within the membership have disagreed over cooperation with the government.

The Ecuadorean Central of Class Organizations (CEDOC) maintains a membership of some 18,000 and has never had notable success among urban workers. CEDOC has maintained a mixed attitude toward the military government, but has aligned itself more with the CTE than with the more critical CEOSL.

3. Electoral practices (U/OU)

The 1967 Constitution restricted participation in national elections to legally recognized political parties, but most groups were able to qualify. An organization was required to submit an application with 5,000 signatures, to have a democratic program for solving national problems, and to demonstrate "an active life" in two population centers and two provinces. Even in the 1968 elections a multiplicity of groups, in combinations that varied from region to region, participated. The three principal presidential candidates were backed by coalitions of differing strengths, and some 11 groups plus independents of all political colorations were represented in the legislature before its dissolution in 1979. This fractionalization, so characteristic of any Ecuadorean enterprise, was magnified by the system of proportional representa-

tion that permitted provincial organizations having a membership of at least 2% of the registered voters in a province to participate in national elections.

Suffrage is universal and mandatory for all literate Ecuadoreans at least 18 years old, with the exception of members of the armed forces and national police on active duty. Suffrage was extended to women in 1929, but it was not until 1948 that they participated in the elections in any significant number. In 1968 women were obliged to vote—as are the men—for the first time. Beginning about 1945 the government made a genuine effort to increase the literacy rate, which has since risen to about 70% and has greatly increased the eligible electorate. The major factor in the growth in the number of registered voters in the 1951-60 decade, however, was the orderly democratic succession which marked those years and increased the interest of the general public in electoral participation. During the 1960's, however, political turbulence caused a general loss of respect for elections. In 1968 a new voter registration system was instituted whereby citizens must possess an official identity card in order to vote. Citizen apathy in obtaining identity cards has reduced the number of eligible voters. In the October 1966 Constituent Assembly elections, there were 1,034,315 registered voters, of whom 633,964, or 61%, voted; 9.3% of the ballots were invalid as compared with 10.5% in 1962. In the 1968 presidential election there were only 928,981 voters, representing 33% of the total adult population.

D. National policies

The military government faces many of the same fundamental problems that have plagued Ecuador for decades, including a grossly unbalanced distribution of national wealth, an archaic agricultural system, poor roads, a lack of schools, and a lack of political consciousness among a large segment of the population. In foreign affairs the government must deal with such perennial problems as foreign economic assistance and investment, enforcing its claim to 200 miles of coastal waters, and balance of payments deficits. The problems of how best to deal with foreign oil companies and how to distribute the revenues from the export of crude oil, however, must be faced for the first time by any Ecuadorean Government. (U/OU)

The military government has been very slow to enunciate policies since taking office in February 1972. In addition to President Rodriguez' innate indecision, debate between moderates and radicals within the government has stalled both the development and implementation of policies. On 10

March 1972 the President spoke on nationwide television for more than 2 hours and outlined the objectives of his administration. The presentation called for sweeping changes in virtually every aspect of life. At the same time, Rodriguez avoided specifics enough to permit a good deal of leeway as the government began to act. Actual policy development, however, depends on implementing decrees that come from the Cabinet. (U/OU)

I. Domestic (C)

a. Political

President Rodriguez has referred to the situation under the Velasco government as "chaotic," "irresponsible," and "irrational." Although this language may be somewhat exaggerated, there is no question that Velasco floundered in an increasingly difficult economic situation. Rodriguez has made clear his intention to break completely with the previous political system. This would involve, among other things, efforts to end blatant corruption. In addition, in his speech the President said that his goals could be attained only through "joint action of all Ecuadoreans, without political partisanship or group interests." This statement hinted at an attempt to encourage the demise of the political parties, and in May 1972 the government announced that parties found guilty of subversion would be dissolved. The government has been slow to enunciate its plans for a new political system to replace the one which it considered a failure. In the early months of the military administration the existing political organizations remained fairly quiet and showed no inclination to challenge the government or to demand a return to electoral democracy.

President Rodriguez is aware that attention must be paid to the problem of establishing some system whereby the large group of apolitical citizens can be brought into the political process. The traditional *caudillo* system has proven inadequate to form a solid political base for development. For most Ecuadoreans, there is little positive concept of a national government. President Rodriguez and members of his Cabinet make frequent visits to cities and towns throughout the country in an attempt to bring the government closer to the people. This method, however, is a drain on the government leaders, and they may be forced to develop more institutionalized channels of communication between the people and the government. It is certain that popular pressure for more extensive economic and political reforms will increase rather than decrease in the coming months and years.

b. Social

The present government has emphasized the importance of education. Rodriguez plans to expand the public school system to increase literacy and to provide at least primary education for the entire country. Private schools offering religious education will be permitted. The President has confirmed the professional autonomy of the national university, a highly emotional issue, but indicated that strikes by teachers, which in the past have been extremely disruptive, would not be permitted. The government has indicated its unwillingness to grant the universities territorial autonomy, however.

In his overall policy speech President Rodriguez called for urban reform to convert "improperly used urban property to the productive social goals required by the community." He also said his government would emphasize regional development—in an attempt to end migration to the cities—and community activities, with emphasis on the highland and jungle Indians.

Despite the support the administration has received from the oligarchy, President Rodriguez says he intends to implement a new and far-reaching agrarian reform effort. Although the program is still in the planning stage, it apparently involves turning the land over to those who work it, perhaps through a series of cooperative organizations. Compensation for expropriated property would be made in government bonds based on the valuation for tax purposes and certain other considerations. In addition, the government plans to carry out rural settlement programs.

c. Petroleum

The question of handling the new petroleum production, which began in mid-1972, was uppermost in the minds of the administrators as they began to develop their policies. On 10 March 1972 President Rodriguez emphasized the necessity for "a rational exploitation, the maintenance of reserves for future needs, without forgetting the just profitability of investments by the petroleum companies." As the bulk of the investment is from U.S.-based companies, U.S. investors have watched closely the development of the oil policy. In June 1972 the government issued a decree applying retroactively the highly restrictive Hydrocarbons Law of October 1971 to existing contracts with foreign companies. Most of these companies balked at paying the higher rental rates and claimed that the government had broken faith, although most eventually paid when so compelled in November. The Texaco-Gulf consortium, which

began exportation in August 1972, has been willing to live with most of the new governmental decrees. Many companies still in the exploration stage, however, believe that the returns will not justify the demands levied by Ecuador. Even Texaco-Gulf allowed acreage containing six successful exploratory wells to revert to the government in January 1973. Evidence that the exploitable petroleum reserves are significantly smaller than had been estimated has weakened the government's bargaining position. The government plans to create a national fleet of oil tankers, and has already formed a state petroleum corporation to insure increased national participation in the oil industry.

The first shipment of crude oil left the port of Esmeraldas aboard a U.S. tanker in mid-August 1972. The government hopes to realize net foreign exchange earnings of US\$130 million in 1973. The desire to prevent corrupt or irresponsible civilian control of this revenue was an important factor prompting the military to oust the civilian President in February 1972. The government has high expectations for oil revenues and has indicated that education will be one sector receiving increased funds.

d. Economic and financial controls

The Ecuadorean Government exercises a moderate degree of influence over the economy through public enterprises and various types of controls, such as price support programs, import and distribution quotas, and price controls on certain food commodities. In 1970 there were more than 1,000 autonomous and decentralized enterprises. Under the dictatorial powers assumed by President Velasco on 22 June 1970, the government took direct control over some of these agencies in a sweeping effort to modernize the inefficient fiscal structure. Prior to this the central government retained only about two-thirds of the revenue it collected, the rest being transferred to these agencies.

In the field of development, economic policy since the early 1950's has been directed primarily toward the coastal area through public investments in infrastructure, notably highways and port facilities. The rapid growth of banana exports during the 1950's and through the mid-1960's raised public sector revenues and provided the financial means to increase government expenditures. Since that time, however, the government's chronic financial difficulties have limited public investment in infrastructure facilities. Shortly after taking office, the Minister of Finance in the Rodriguez government announced that the Velasco administration had left national finances in

chaos and that another large budget deficit was in prospect unless spending was reduced.

Economic development has relied heavily on private enterprise. Government action has been more direct and effective in stimulating both foreign and domestic private investment in manufacturing than in agriculture. The 1973-77 development program includes governmental assistance to new investments in the paper, cement, electrical products, precision instruments, shipbuilding, food processing, lumber, chemicals, and plastic industries. It also envisions spending additional funds on roads and electrical power installations.

2. Foreign (S)

a. Territorial sea and land boundaries

A main element in foreign policy since 1966 has been the claim by Ecuador that its territorial waters extend 200 miles and that it also has jurisdiction over the airspace of this area. This claim to sovereignty over adjacent ocean areas is echoed by an increasing number of developing countries, but most vociferously by those in Latin America. Ecuador, like Chile and Peru, considers these waters a valuable source of revenue for its own fishing industry and wants to insure that this "natural" resource is not unfairly exploited by other maritime nations. Ecuador's strict enforcement of this claim is also based on a strong sense of nationalism, and the desire for the revenue brought in from licenses, fees, and fines. The Law of the Seas Conference scheduled to be held under U.N. auspices in 1974 may resolve some of the problems stemming from conflicting national maritime claims.

In 1971 Ecuador seized more than 50 U.S. fishing boats operating within the 200-mile limit without Ecuadorean licenses and collected some US\$2.5 million in fines and fees. Ecuador holds that the U.S. policy of reimbursing U.S. fishermen for fines paid to Ecuador for these violations only encourages further flouting of the law. The U.S. Congress passed legislation in 1971 requiring that foreign military sales be suspended for a year following such seizures, and the implementation of this law has strained relations between the two countries. The March 1972 amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act would have cut off all aid to Ecuador if a provision for waiver, on grounds of national security, had not been quickly exercised. The Ecuadorean Government has labeled punitive legislation of this type a form of economic imperialism and is attempting to build support for its position on the 200-mile limit among

other Latin American, Asian, and African nations in preparation for the Law of the Sea Conference.

Another important factor in Ecuadorean foreign policy since independence has involved the boundary disputes that are legacies of the indistinct colonial divisions. The major geographic preoccupation has been with Peru. The frequent bitterness of this relationship has stemmed largely from Ecuador's frustrated longing to realize its colonial claims to a portion of the upper Amazon Basin. Inability to implement these claims in the jungle, in conjunction with aggressive Peruvian extension of control up the Marañon-Amazon tributaries, placed Ecuador in an increasingly poor bargaining position.

In July 1941 Peru invaded El Oro Province on the Gulf of Guayaquil. Ecuadorean forces were swiftly overrun by the numerically superior Peruvian land, sea, and air forces. Ecuador acceded to a territorial settlement in January 1942. The 1942 Rio Protocol established in detail numerous geographic points for the demarcation of a border between Ecuador and Peru, guaranteed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. Although the agreement was accepted initially by Ecuador, the government later claimed that technical inaccuracies based on erroneous geography made the protocol invalid. Keeping the frontier undefined leaves Ecuador some vague hope of eventually obtaining what its nationalism perennially demands—some territory in the Amazon River system. Most official documents, in fact, bear the inscription, "Ecuador has been, is, and will be an Amazonian country." Although the anniversary of the Rio Protocol (29 January) no longer automatically calls forth anti-Peruvian demonstrations, the issue could be rekindled at any time by an administration that wanted to find an emotional topic in foreign policy.

b. Relations with Communist countries

President Velasco undertook a policy of expanding commercial and diplomatic relations with Communist countries, and President Rodriguez has said that Ecuador would maintain relations with all nations "if these relations are advantageous to the national interests and dignity." During 1969 Velasco reestablished or reactivated diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Consular relations with Bulgaria were established in July 1969, and diplomatic relations with Hungary were formalized in January 1970. Under the Velasco administration Ecuador carried on small-scale trade with Cuba and Communist China and broke diplomatic relations with Nationalist China in 1972. Ecuador supported Peru's effort in June 1972 to have

the Organization of American States reexamine the question of Cuban sanctions. Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro stopped over briefly in Ecuador during his return from a month-long visit to Chile in December 1971. President Rodriguez often refers to such moves, as did Velasco before him, as evidence of Ecuador's "independent" foreign policy.

c. Other foreign relations

Except for the recurrent irritant of the border dispute with Peru, Ecuador's relations with its neighbors have been generally good. Ecuador joined the Latin American Free Trade Association in 1961, but by the mid-1960's it had already become apparent that the less developed countries in the association were at a marked disadvantage. Therefore, in 1966 the Presidents of Colombia, Chile, and Venezuela and representatives of the Presidents of Peru and Ecuador met to discuss the development of a subregional plan. They were joined in 1967 by Bolivia. Venezuela withdrew temporarily, but in May 1969 the other five countries signed the Andean Subregional Integration Pact. The Venezuelan Government has negotiated entry into the pact. The six nations hope to have the Andean Common Market, as it is commonly known, in full operation by 1980. Its purpose is to rationalize the distribution of new industries, reduce trade barriers, facilitate the development of multinational projects, and harmonize conditions for foreign investment. In 1966 Ecuador and Colombia agreed on a plan for the joint development of power, irrigation, and other facilities in the once disputed Hoya del Carchi and joint exploitation of the Orito oilfield. In 1972 they established a mixed commission to study the possibilities for joint marketing as well as exploitation of oil.

Relations with Chile have traditionally been cordial and were strengthened in the 1960's by the similar positions held by the two countries on territorial waters and on their participation in the Andean Common Market. On the occasion of Chilean President Salvador Allende's official visit to Quito in September 1971, Velasco Ibarra joined him in a communique condemning the politics of the great powers and calling for Latin American unity. In particular, the two Presidents condemned the role of big foreign corporations in Latin American development and pledged adherence to the 200-mile territorial waters claim.

In the past, Ecuador has participated rather actively in international bodies, especially the United Nations and the Organization of American States. It also is a member of the Inter-American Defense Board, which

plans for joint defense of the Western Hemisphere, and is a signatory of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, under which it assumes the obligation to support American states threatened by aggression.

Outside the hemisphere, Ecuador's most important relations are with West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Israel. All have provided loans, aid, or investments. German and Japanese investors have participated in the development of Quito's electrical power.

E. Threats to government stability

1. Discontent and dissidence

a. Social and political disaffection (U/OU)

As in most underdeveloped countries, social and political discontent in Ecuador has its roots in the rigid social structure and the wide disparities in living standards between the large majority comprising the lower classes and the small middle and upper classes. Discontent has been most widespread among the lower class and lower middle class mestizos and *montucios* (coast dwellers). These elements vent their frustrations through unions and student organizations, or simply by joining spontaneously in street demonstrations and other forms of civil unrest. Youth has become frustrated with the social stratification that limits opportunity for social and economic advancement.

A major source of discontent is found in urban slums, such as those in Guayaquil, which house the thousands of mestizos and Indians who have come to the city in recent years in search of better jobs and living conditions. These brutalizing *barrios suburbanos* (suburban slums) in the marshes along the Rio Guayas² contained about 250,000 persons in mid-1969, or a third of the metropolitan population. The depressed, unsanitary, disease-ridden existence of the slum dwellers makes them ripe for antisocial behavior. Crime, prostitution, and narcotics traffic are commonplace. Because of these conditions, Guayaquil has become a volatile center of political and social discontent, with a potential for violence that extremists seek to exploit.

Political life has been characterized by irresponsibility on the part of disgruntled aspirants for power, who try to use or manipulate discontented groups as a means of bringing pressure on the government. The

²For diacritics on place names see the map in the text and the list of names at the end of the chapter.

highly partisan and personalized nature of politics and the failure to develop responsible political institutions or leaders have helped to make domestic politics a destructive force rather than a factor for constructive change. No administration in recent years has been able to win enough popular support to insure implementation of its program without being subject to almost constant harassment from the opposition, particularly in the Congress. There is at present no indication that the younger politicians are prepared to break from this pattern.

The continued rivalry between the peoples of the Sierra and the Costa and the frustration of youth, particularly students, are potential sources of civil unrest and violence. National and regional holidays have come to be occasions for voicing discontent, and demonstrations held on these days are often exploited by extremists for their own ends. Guayaquil celebrates its independence on 9 October, and this event has frequently been accompanied by violent demonstrations in behalf of whatever happens to be the current issue in dispute between the Costa and the Sierra.

A potential source of difficulty for the national government is the large Indian population, which has been excluded from political and economic life since colonial times. As yet no subversive group has been able to overcome the apathy and insularity that characterize the Indians, but as modern technology and communications reach further into the interior, this situation could change drastically. In particular, the development of the oilfields and the activity accompanying the trans-Ecuadorian pipeline could draw the Indians into increasing acceptance of or conflict with modern Ecuadorian society.

President Rodriguez employs the armed forces in nonmilitary activities, such as rural fairs, agricultural stations, and machine shops. These efforts will increase contact between the rural and urban poor and the more advanced sectors.

b. Economic grievances (U/OU)

Most economic discontent is a result of interlocking problems involving workers and students. As the cost of living rises, both groups look for a scapegoat, which most often turns out to be the government.

Discontent has also been generated by chronic budget deficits, which have repeatedly delayed payment of salaries to government employees and military personnel. Such deficits have also limited government programs in education, agriculture, and public works. The present military leaders have attempted to bring a degree of stability to the economy through sound management and tight fiscal

policies, including antismuggling measures. They are counting heavily on oil revenues to aid them in this endeavor.

Ecuadorian politicians are fond of praising the richness and potential of their land. These statements often tend to be counterproductive, because if they are believed, they generate demands and expectations that the government cannot fulfill. In addition, modern communications have spread knowledge of modern life, and many Ecuadorians demand a share in the wonders of the 20th century.

c. Dissident elements (S)

(1) *Students*—Students are disturbed over the scarcity of jobs they consider commensurate with their education. On the other hand, the educational system has failed to provide enough people with technical training to meet the country's needs. Some of this problem stems from student resistance to technical subjects, because the traditional professions of law and medicine remain prestigious. Teaching methods, physical plants, and administrative practices are inadequate, and efforts begun in 1969 to upgrade vocational training have produced few results. Discontent and frustration over these issues, coupled with a strong sense of nationalism and anti-imperialism among students, are a volatile mixture in the schools. These feelings are often directed against the government in power and occasionally against the United States. Complete university autonomy is a cherished goal of Ecuadorian students and constitutes another simmering issue.

Student unrest in Guayaquil during 1969 reached major proportions, with the single most violent disturbance occurring on 29 May—coinciding with the arrival in Quito of the Rockefeller delegation, which was visiting various Latin American countries. Six students were killed at the University of Guayaquil in clashes with security forces. Since then, the final days of May have been a time when students have demonstrated in memory of those killed. The military government has had a bit more success than did Velasco in containing this disaffection, but the fact remains that students helped significantly to overthrow the government in 1966.

(2) *Labor*—Workers in general have little faith in political institutions and leaders. Labor unions are poorly represented in political movements—one exception being the Bucaram movement—and some unions have been infiltrated by subversive groups that have sought to use organized labor to advance their own interests. In addition, most labor unions are weak

and have done little to help the interests of the workers.

Nonetheless, using appropriate issues, the labor confederations are capable of calling workers into the streets for demonstrations. In addition, if strikes are properly planned they can impede the operation of the government and vital parts of the economy, for example, in the oilfields of the Oriente.

(3) *Military*—Under the military government the armed forces as a whole probably do not constitute a dissident element. Interservice rivalries and differences of opinion, however, prevent the military from presenting a unified front to the civilian population. In particular, naval officers have chafed under what they conceive to be the predominant role played by the army in the present administration. The navy generally is the most progressive of the three services, and some officers dislike the moderate trend they perceive under Rodriguez. In addition, there is a traditional relationship between some naval officers and leftist groups in Guayaquil. The navy by itself would probably be unable to oust a President, but it could complicate his efforts considerably.

2. Subversion (S)

a. Historical perspective

Subversion leading to the overthrow of the government has been a historic part of Ecuadorian political life. Most political leaders at least consider subversion one method for achieving office, and often they have formed alliances of convenience with extremist elements and professional revolutionaries. The 12 years of constitutional democracy from 1948 to 1960 lulled some Ecuadorians, as well as some foreign observers, into thinking that the country finally had made a break with its turbulent, unstable past. Before 1948 a frequent means of changing the incumbent President was by coup or threat of coup. There were 14 Presidents in the 1930's alone.

Since 1960 the irregular changes of government have come about mainly because the people in power lost effective control of the government, and some change was needed to keep the country operating. As a result, it is difficult to detect any long-term subversive trend. As during the 1930's and 1940's, it was Velasco who provided the impetus for much of the political activity from 1960 to 1972.

When Velasco was elected to his fourth presidential term in 1960, military leaders were apprehensive, although they had managed to endure his previous term (1952-56) without undue difficulty. Nevertheless, his relationship with the armed forces had always been

tenuous, and many leaders were wary of a new term. He appeared to justify these fears by purging 48 senior officers at once on 1 September 1960, his first day in office. Other factors diminishing the confidence of the military in his administration arose from the fiscal irresponsibility and administrative chaos that quickly enveloped his government. The armed forces, however, were reluctant to intervene in the government, particularly as many leaders were opposed to leftist Vice President Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy. An anti-Velasco demonstration in November 1961, during which two students were killed, provided the final nudge for ousting Velasco, but air force planes bombed army tanks before military leaders agreed to follow the "constitutional" path and allowed Arosemena to enter the President's palace.

Arosemena quickly justified the fears of military opponents because of his leftist views and his sporadic binges, during which the government received virtually no direction. Nevertheless, it was not until July 1963 that the three service chiefs agreed to replace the President. They constituted themselves as a junta and included a widely respected army colonel who had led the plotting against Arosemena.

Although the junta initially had widespread military support and public acceptance, the low caliber of some of its members hampered the effort to undertake needed reforms. In addition, they pushed too rapidly for reforms and ignored many political realities, particularly the fact that the important politicians, led by ex-President Ponce, wanted a quick return to civilian rule. The inability to agree on a political solution so weakened popular support that other military leaders withdrew their support, and in March 1966 the members resigned. The two interim Presidents and the Constitutional Assembly that followed gave the country only weak direction, but there was little antigovernment activity, because most political forces were represented to some extent, and thus their energies were channelled into relatively legitimate functions. When the presidential election of June 1968 resulted in another victory for Velasco, however, the military once again became concerned about the future of the armed forces as well as about the direction of the country.

Velasco's overthrow in 1972 resulted from fear that Assad Bucaram would become the next President rather than from a desire on the part of military leaders to assume power. This takeover differs from most previous ones in two important respects, however. There has been no indication from government officials of any intention to return to

civilian rule within a definite period of time. In addition, the Rodriguez administration intends to try to implement important reforms. Although the junta tried unsuccessfully to carry out similar programs, the revenue anticipated from the new oilfields may provide the present government with more resources, and hence better prospects.

b. Activities of extralegal organizations

The activities of subversive organizations, either of the right or the left, over the last decade and a half have had little effect on the changes of government. The most important attempt was by the Communist Party of Ecuador in 1962 and 1963 during the administration of Carlos Julio Arosemena, although the outcome was distinctly unfavorable for Communists of all persuasions. The party had gained influence and prestige during the Velasco administration and the first few months of the Arosemena administration, but it was deeply divided and confused about the role of armed revolution. A number of extremists had already left the party and started their own independent groups.

In order to preserve some semblance of unity and to mollify the activists, the party leadership in January 1962 openly endorsed armed revolution. It formed clandestine branches, which appear to have been organized primarily for training and organizing guerrillas and urban terrorists. The Pichincha provincial committee and its secretary general, Rafael Echeverria, were the motivating force. Echeverria went to Cuba in early January 1962 and, after indoctrination courses, returned to Ecuador as a dedicated revolutionary. At the seventh congress of the PCE in March 1962 he was able to obtain formal approval of armed revolution as the official line, but he did not gain control of the party machinery.

The pro-Castro elements originally protected by President Arosemena had lost popular support throughout the early months of 1962, however, partly because of Fidel Castro's insults to Arosemena. In March Arosemena was in a very weak position because of his leftist sympathies, but he strengthened his hold on the government when he gave in to strong military pressure and broke relations with Cuba, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In late April an independent group of pro-Castro adventurers, mostly members of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE), tried to stage a guerrilla uprising in the area near Santo Domingo de los Colorados, allegedly on orders from Cuba. The uprising was a total fiasco. About 40 persons were arrested immediately, and the others were rounded up within a few days. This incident,

however, prompted some military leaders to take a closer look at the permissive atmosphere encouraged by President Arosemena, and their conclusions contributed eventually to his downfall. In addition, the guerrilla activity led eventually to a split in the PCE, with Echeverria forming his own group, although he was never able to undertake guerrilla activity to the extent he had hoped.

Despite repression and imprisonment of leftists by the military junta during 1963-66, a number of small subversive groups emerged. None was of more than marginal importance, although the general deterioration of the public order helped to topple the junta.

During the early months of 1966 Camilo Ponce Enriquez organized an *ad hoc* group called the "Constitutionalist Front," with the aim of overthrowing the junta. The front advocated a speedy return to civilian rule, but under a constitution drawn up by an elected assembly rather than dictated by the junta. In addition, the civilian politicians wanted the junta to leave office before holding a presidential election, fearing that if the military retained power it would impose its own candidate on the electorate.

During the early months of the Rodriguez administration there was no significant subversive activity. Most leftist groups, except for a few extremists, either have attended to work with the administration or have maintained a position of neutrality, perhaps waiting for the government to commit itself to a firm direction, or hoping to win support from among disgruntled political groups.

F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

1. Police

The National Civil Police (PCN) is the principal nationwide law enforcement agency; municipalities also have their own local organizations. To provide police services to an estimated population of 6.5 million, the PCN had in 1972 an authorized and actual strength of 7,050 officers and men, resulting in a ratio of about one policeman to every 900 persons. This ratio is considerably lower in the rural areas, where 64% of the population resides. The rural police, numbering between 15% and 20% of the total, are organized under the Rural Division of the PCN. They are often called upon for prison duty or to assist in nearby cities as needed.

The PCN is directly subordinate to the Minister of Government and Police and in times of emergency to the Commander of the Army. Its mission is the maintenance of public order, traffic control and

regulation, crime detection and prevention, control of demonstrations, and the location and identification of dissidents and potential insurgents. When under operational control of the army during a national emergency, assistance in controlling insurgency is an additional mission.


The head of the PCN is a commander general, with operational and staff headquarters in Quito. Directly subordinate to the commander general are the National Training Institute in Quito and the four numbered operational departments, four administrative departments, and the four geographical police districts covering the entire country.

Most of the commissioned officers in the PCN are graduates of the National Training Institute. Also eligible for commissions are individuals who have attended a foreign police institution with the authorization of the Ecuadorian Government and policemen who have proven their mental qualifications in special courses ordered by the commander or who have fulfilled the requisites for advancement to officer status on a merit basis, but instances of such commissions are not common. The urban police function in the cities and larger towns. The rural police, who receive the same pay and have the same functions as the urban units, are scattered throughout the inhabited parts of the countryside. The local police chief functions as a judge in minor cases. In 1971 the radio network was improved, and a voice-operated police network was extended throughout the country, with 40 base stations and some mobile units operating on a 24-hour basis.

In April 1972 a force of 40 tourist police was established in Quito. These men have had a course in English and are well versed in Ecuadorian folklore, art, geography, and history. They collaborate directly with the National Directorate of Tourism, and their duties include assisting visitors in every way possible. They are stationed at the airport, hotels, and in the business section of the city. This service may be extended to Guayaquil.

The PCN has been generally effective in controlling demonstrations and disturbances in urban areas and identifying and locating developing insurgent elements and activities in urban areas. Its rural police, however, would be hard pressed to deal with guerrilla activities, should any develop. Improved mobility and communications, better training, improved administration, and greater governmental budget support for logistics have increased the overall capabilities of the PCN substantially, in spite of inadequate manpower. Public approval of police riot control methods has grown in recent years.

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Chronology (u/ou)

1460-80

Inca Tupac Yupanqui conquers southern provinces of Ecuador.

1526

Tupac Yupanqui's son Huáscar dies, dividing his kingdom between Huáscar, in the south, and Atahualpa in the north. Civil wars result, weakening the Incas, with Atahualpa the ultimate victor.

1534

Colonial Quito is founded by Sebastián de Benalcázar after Inca settlement is burned by retreating Indians.

1563

Quito is made a seat of the Royal Audiencia.

1765

Economic grievances lead to popular revolt.

1770-1800

Indian peasants engage in four uprisings.

1822

Battle of Pichincha secures Ecuadorian independence from Spain; Ecuador joins Colombia and Venezuela in the Confederation of Gran Colombia.

1830

Ecuador secedes from Gran Colombia to form an independent republic.

1860-75

Gabriel García Moreno dominates politics and attempts to build a theocratic state.

1895

Liberalism triumphs under Eloy Alfaro.

1925

Military revolts against political elite dominated by coastal bankers.

1934

Jose María Velasco Ibarra is elected President.

1935

Velasco is deposed.

1941

July-August

Ecuador suffers humiliating military defeat by Peru in border war.

1942

January

Protocol is signed at Rio de Janeiro defining the disputed borders with Peru and providing for their definitive demarcation, under guarantee of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and the United States.

1944

May-June

Coup returns Velasco to power.

1947

August

Velasco is ousted by military coup.

September

Carlos Julio Arosemena is declared Interim President by Congress.

1948

June

Galo Plaza Lasso is elected President in a fair national election.

1952

June

Velasco, candidate of the National Velasquista Movement, is elected President in the first transfer of power by an elected President to an elected successor in over three decades.

1956

June

Camilo Ponce Enríquez is elected President, the first elected to the office by the Conservatives in 60 years.

1960

June

Velasco is again elected President.

1961

November

Velasco, ousted by Congressional and military action, is replaced by leftist Vice President Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, son of previous President.

1963

July

Arosemena—alcoholic, inept, and lenient toward Communists—is ousted by armed forces; military junta takes power.

1964

July

Junta announces agrarian and other reforms aimed at allaying criticism and discontent.

1966

March

Junta relinquishes power to civilian Interim President Clemente Yerovi Indaburu.

1966
October

A Constituent Assembly is elected to prepare groundwork for return to constitutionality.

November

Constituent Assembly names Otto Arosemena Gomez Provisional President.

1967

April

During meeting of American Chiefs of State at Punta del Este, Uruguay, President Arosemena adopts stance critical of U.S. hemispheric actions.

May

New Constitution is adopted; Arosemena term is extended to 1 September 1968; national elections are scheduled.

1968

June

Velasco is again elected in close three-way presidential race. Bicameral legislature is also elected.

1968

September

Velasco becomes President for fifth time in final phase of full return to constitutional government.

1970

June

President Velasco assumes extraconstitutional power in face of continuing financial crisis and student disorders. Congress is closed and modified version of 1946 Constitution is reimposed.

1972

February

President Velasco is again ousted by military coup; Army Commander Gen. Guillermo Rodriguez Lara becomes President.

August

First cargo of Ecuadorian crude oil leaves port of Balao near Esmeraldas, making Ecuador Latin America's second-largest oil exporter, behind Venezuela.

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	SPANISH	ENGLISH
CEDOC.....	Central Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Clasistas	Ecuadorian Central of Class Organiza- tions
CEOSL.....	Confederacion Ecuatoriana de Organiza- ciones Sindicales Libres	Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Labor Organizations
CFP.....	Concentracion de Fuerzas Populares...	Concentration of Popular Forces
CRE.....	Comunismo Revolucionario del Ecuador	Revolutionary Communism of Ecuador
CTE.....	Confederacion de Trabajadores Ecu- atorianos	Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers
DGI.....	Direccion General de Informacion.....	General Directorate of Intelligence
FESE.....	Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarios del Ecuador	Federation of Ecuadorian Secondary Students
FEUE.....	Federacion de Estudiantes Universitarios del Ecuador	Federation of Ecuadorian University Students
FNV.....	Federacion Nacional Velasquista.....	National Velasquista Federation
JCE.....	Juventud Comunista del Ecuador.....	Communist Youth of Ecuador
MIR.....	Movimiento Izquierdo Revolucionario..	Leftist Revolutionary Movement
PC.....	Partido Conservador.....	Conservative Party
PCE.....	Partido Comunista del Ecuador.....	Communist Party of Ecuador
PCE/ML.....	Partido Comunista del Ecuador/ Marxista-Leninista	Communist Party of Ecuador/Marxist- Leninist
PCN.....	Policia Civil Nacional.....	National Civil Police
PLRE.....	Partido Liberal Radical del Ecuador..	Radical Liberal Party of Ecuador
PSC.....	Partido Social Cristiano.....	Social Christian Party
PSE.....	Partido Socialista del Ecuador.....	Ecuadorian Socialist Party
PSRE.....	Partido Socialista Revolucionario del Ecuador	Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ecuador
PSU.....	Partido Socialista Unido.....	Unified Socialist Party
URJE.....	Union Revolucionaria de la Juventud del Ecuador	Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorian Youth

Places and features referred to in this chapter (u/ou)

	COORDINATES	
	° 'S.	° 'W.
Ambato.....	1 15	78 37
Andes (<i>mts</i>).....	2 00	78 40
Cuenca.....	2 53	78 59
Emeralda.....	0 59N	79 42
Galapagos Islands (<i>isls</i>).....	0 30	90 30
Guayaquil.....	2 10	79 50
Golfo de Guayaquil (<i>gulf</i>).....	3 00	80 30
Hoya del Cachi (<i>basin</i>).....	0 45N	77 45
Ibarra.....	0 21N	78 07
Loja.....	4 00	79 13
Orito (<i>oilfield</i>).....		
Quito.....	0 13	78 30
Riobamba.....	1 40	78 38
Rio Guayas (<i>strm</i>).....	2 36	79 52
Santo Domingo.....	0 15	79 09

NOTE—All latitudes are South unless otherwise indicated.